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Abstract 
This paper proposes an indicator of exchange rate risk for currencies subject to exchange 
rate regimes which are not perfectly credible. This ·indicator is applied to several EMS 
currencies for periods before and after the widening of the fluctuation bands. We find that, 
contrary to what standard (GARCH-type) estimates suggest, exchange rate risk within the 
ER� is generally lower after the band widening than before. However) exchange rate risk 
for currencies that left the ERM is currently higher than for ERM currencies and also 
higher than in the period when they belonged to the mechanism. 
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1 Introduction 
Betwe-?n 1987 and the summer of 1992, the exchange ra.tes of the currencies in the Exchange 
Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS) showed a. high degree of 
stability. After that, however, the system was hit by the worst crisis it had ever faced. This 
crisis gave rise to a reform of the ERM that entailed the temporary widening of the maximum 
fluctuation limits for bilateral rates to ±15%. 
During the crisis, the volatility of the excha.nge rates ViS4a,-vis the Deutsche mark, measured 
by the sa.mple variance of their ra.te of change, increased nearly fourfold. At present, even 
though exchange rates have tended to be less volatile since the widening of the bands, volatility 
is still approximately two times higher than in the period of greatest stability in the System. 
From the va.ntage of the founding objectives of the EMS, this rise in exchange rate volatility 
has been viewed as a negative development. Thus, one of the main concerns prompted by the 
widening of ERM bands refers to the possibility that the wider margin of fluctuation ava.ilable 
.may jeopardise the goal of exchange rate stability and, by heightening the exchange rate risk 
perceived by a.gents, may undermine the benefits and even the feasibility of the process of 
economic integration in Europe. 
However, aU too frequently, this concern arises from the reading of measures of excha.nge 
rate volatility which, in general, provide poor estimates of the concept of exchange rate risk that 
is relevant to the decisions of market agents. Following the study of Ungerer et a1. (1986) on 
the effects of EMS membership on exchange rate and interest rate volatility, numerous pa.pers 
have underscored the. importance of using statistics that measure the conditional variance of 
the series rather than the unconditional variance. To this end, by estimating processes tha.t 
model the predictable component of volatility, efforts have focused on obta.ining an indicator of 
the volatility perceived or anticipated by agents. Thus, Artis and Taylor (1988) and Fratianni 
and Von Hagen (1990), for example, model the conditional variance of the excha.nge rates 
using the ARCH methodology introduced by Engle (1982). 
Nonetheless, even measures of the conditional variance of exchange rates can prove inad­
equate for measuring the perceived exchange rate risk, if they focus solely on historical data, 
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as in the ARCH models. Those measures fa.il to take into account the possibility that agents 
ma.y consider that the exchange rate regime is likely to change, even though this might not be 
later confirmed. If, for instance, agents expect a devaluation of the currency, the subjective 
distribution of the exchange rate incorporates this event in its first and second order moment. 
If the devaluation does not occur, the volatility estimated on the basis of observed data will 
tend to underestimate the risk perceived by agents when they carry out transactions in a 
foreign currency. The effect of those unobservable events on the conditional mean is known 
in the literature as the "peso problem" (see e.g. Krasker, 1980) and has been the subject of 
frequent analysis in different contexts. This contrasts with the dearth of studies that extend 
the analysis to second order conditional moments, as the study of exchange risk requires. 
The importa.nce of using exchange risk indicators which incorporate the degree of credi­
bility of the fluctuation regime is even greater if we consider that, in general, those who have 
expressed concern over the increase of exchange rate variances have also acknowledged that 
the widening of fluctuation bands has made the ERM more sustainable. Naturally, this gain 
in the System's credibility -which is evident by simple inspection of the usual indicators (see 
e.g. Svensson, 1993)-, was also favoured by the corrections made on exchange rates during 
the crisis and by the observed easing of economic policy dilemmas. Therefore, a.n analysis 
of exchange rate risk in the ERM requires proposing indicators that are capa.ble of reflecting 
both the observed volatility and the perceived sustainability of the exchange rate regime. 
This task is partially udertaken in this paper. Thus, the paper proposes an exchange risk 
indicator which allows the absence of perfect credibility of fluctuation regimes. This indicator 
is used to evaluate the exchange rate risk associated to the peseta and other ERM currencies 
between June 1989 and February 1994, paying special attention to the changes observed after 
the widening of the hands. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 obtains the conditional va.riance 
of the exchange rate when it is subject to a system with imperfect credibility and proposes 
a method for its estimation. Section 3 uses this indicator to study the risk associated to 
the peseta/D-mark exchange rate. Section 4 extends the analysis to other ERM currencies. 
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Section 5 presents the main conclusions of the analysis. 
2 Exchange Rate Risk Under Imperfect Credibility 
In line with the financial literature, this paper measures the risk associated to the exchange 
rate variation at moment t at term T as the variance of the exchange rate at t + T, conditioned 
to all information available at t.This conditional variance is defined as 
where EI is the conditional expectation operator at t, and .'It is the (log) market exchange 
rate. T�us, the exchange risk at t is defined as the expected value of the volatility of the 
unanticipated component of the exchange rate at t + T. 
This definition is justified on two fronts. First, even though it is true that greater fluc­
tuations generally imply greater risk, not all the volatility of a series can be considered risk, 
since part of these fluctuations can be anticipated by the market, and the risk indicator should 
evaluate the degree of unpredictability in the exchange rates. Second, the measure of relevant 
exchange risk should be based on the expected or anticipated component of volatility in the 
series, because this is the component that determines agents' decisions. 
2.1 Conditional Variance under Regimes which are not Perfectly Credible 
Assume that the (log) exchange rates. follows at period t a process (Rl) characterized by 
a conditional mean p.: and a conditional variance h:. However, agents assign at that period, 
a probability Pt to the next period exchange rate being a realization of a different stochastic 
process (R2) with conditional mean J.l.� and conditional varia.nce hi. 
Therefore, the conditional mean at period t of the (log) excha.nge ra.te is 
(1 ) 
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Likewise, the mndit.ional variance is 
Substituing equation (1) into equation (2) yields 
(I -p,)E, [(S'+1 - I'il- P,(/': - I'DIRlj' 
+ p,E, [(8,+1 -1':) + (I -p,)(1'1-I'DIR2j
' = 
[(1 -p,)h) + p,h1j + pi(1 -p,)(1'1-I'D'· (3) 
Thus, the conditional variance of the exchange "rate has two components. The first one is 
the mean of the within the regime conditional variances of both regimes. The second component 
measures the effect on the conditiona.l varia.nce of the expected change in the conditional mean 
of the process. 
In order to illustrate the meaning of equation (3), consider a currency subject to a regime 
characterised by a zero-width band. Assume also that the probability of devaluation is not 
zero. In this ca.<;e, the within the regime conditional variance would be zero under both regimes. 
However, since there exists a risk of devalua.tion (0 < Pt < 1), the conditional variance will be 
positive. Thus, even though the observed market rale does not fluctuate, the foreign exchange 
risk measured by the conditional variance can be high if the observed parity is not sufficiently 
credible. 
Similarly, for regimes characterized by target zones -like the ERM-, equation (3) suggests 
a method to correct the traditional GARCH-type volatility indicators. Thus, equation (3) can 
be rewritten as 
(4) 
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where 
(5) 
Since the sta.ndard indicators only take into account the history of the series, they only 
estimate the within the regime component (h�) of the conditional variance. Therefore, when 
estimating risk, the usual indicators ignore the correction term Ct �hich meaSures the impact 
of the imperfect credibility of the official bands (or of the target zone within those bands). 
Note first that if h: :::::: h;, imperfect credibility (Pt > 0) implies that the standard GARCH 
approach understimates unambigously the conditional' variance of the exchange rate. Second, 
the higher the within the regime volatility of the alternative regime and the higher the absolute 
variation of the conditional mean, the higher the correction term. Third, the second term of 
equation ( 5) is independent of the alternative regime implying a. currency depreciation or a. 
currency appreciation. Finally. the correction term is not a monotonic function of the switching 
proba.bility Pt. In fact, Pt = .5 maximizes the second term of equation (5) for given J.L: and J.Lt. 
2.2 Measuring Foreign Exchange Risk 
In order to measure foreign exchange risk we must specify two alternative processes for the 
excha.nge rate. Using a common practice in the literature, we only consider univariate pro-
cesses. In partie-ular, we assume that the exchange rate is the realization of one of the following 
stochastic processes: 
RI: 3t+l = c + 4>8t + (t+l (6) 
R2: (7) 
where dt is the difference between the conditional mean of the two processes (a jump) and 
(t and Wt arc innovations with zero mean and common conditional variancel (ht) • We also 
lThis assumption implies that both regimes only differ in their conditional mean. Although this assumption 
might not be verified elt-P06t, it avoids making &dditional ubitrary &5SumptionB on the expected change of 
the conditional variAnces. In any case, the ex.post estimates of h, for the different regimes show that thi6 
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assumE" t.hat agents assign at every period t a probability Pt to the current regime switching 
from Hi to R2. Thus at every period t, an exchange rate jump of size dt is expected with 
probability PI. 
From equations (6) and (7), we can rewrite equation (3) as: 
(8) 
Thus, measuring exchange risk requires computing the switching probability Ph the expected 
jump size dt and the conditional variance within the regime ht• 
Assuming that Uncovered Interest Rate Parity (UIP) holds, the expected rate of exchange 
rate jump (Ptdt) can be easily calculated since 
(9) 
where it and i; are the domestic and foreign one-period interest rate respectively 2. 
Naturally, splitting the expected rate of the exchange rate jump into probability and size is 
less straightforward. The approach taken is the usual in the related literature (see Lindberg, 
Svensson and Soderlind, 1993 and Drazen and Masson, 1992). Thus, we fix exogenously 
the- expect.ed jump size, taking into account real exchange rate appreciations and the jumps 
observed after devaluations and other regime variations (free floating and band narrowing 
and widening). Once the expected jump size (dt) has been determined, the probability Pt is 
obtained by dividing the interest rate differential over dt• 
The conditionaJ variance within the regime is estimated using the GARCH methodology 
proposed by Bollerslev (1986). Thus, we assume 
assumption is, at best, biasing downwards the correction telrr. in equation (5). 
2Svensson (1992) and Ayuso and Restoy (1992) provide theoretical and empirical arguments in favour of 
using UIP as an approximate measure of expected exchange rates within the ERM. Notice also that under UIP, 
it - i; - c + (1 - ¢)'t is the expected rate of devaluation defined in Svensson (1993). 
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• • 
hI = 00 + L�i(�+l-i + L:{3jht-i 
1=1 ;=1 
In the empirical work we use daily data. However, since we a.re interested in estimating the 
foreign excha.nge risk associated to horizons longer than one day, we must deal with interest 
rates which correspond to maturities longer than the frequency of the data. In order to handle 
this problem, we assume that there is only one possible jump within the considered horizon r 
and rewrite equations (6) and (7) in the fol owing wa.y: 
Rl': 
R2 ': 
where 
k «1 - 'V) 
1 - 4> ' 
, 
and VtVt+T = V't'1t+T = L 4>1'-iVct"l+i 
i=1 
, 
'1t+7 = � </>T"-
i
Wt+i 
1=1 
(10) 
(11) 
Therefore, PI and d, should be reinterpreted as the probability and the expected size of an 
exchange rale jump between t and t + T respectively. Taking advantage of the linea.r form of 
the GARCH model it is straightforwa.rd to compute the r·period conditional variance Vivt+1" 
For example, for the standard GARCH(l,l) model, it holds that 
j = 2, . .. r 
3 The Exchange Rate Risk of the Spanish Peseta 
(12) 
In this section, we use the methodology described in section 2 to analyse the risk associated 
to the peseta/D-mark exchange rate since the entry of the peseta into the ERM. 
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In order to calculate the conditional variance of the exchange rate we chose a maturity 
of 1 month, since this is the term habitually used in the descriptive studies of exchange rate 
volatility in the ERM. Thus, the (daily) interest rates used correspond to I-month deposits in 
the Euromarket, denominated in pesetas and D-marks, respectively. 
We distinguish four subperiods (see Chart 4.1). The first begins with the peseta's entry into 
the ERM, ends at the time of the September 1992 devaluation and coincides with the 'period of 
greatest stability in the System. The second ends with the devaluation of May 1993, and the 
third concludes few days before the widening of the bands on August 2, 1993 (concretely, July 
22). Hence the second and third subperiods can be taken as the stages of greatest tension in 
the ERM, while the fourth subperiod can be used to illustrate the behaviour of the exchange 
rate within the framework of the new ERM following the widening of fluctuation bands. 
For all four subperiods the parameters of the equations (6) and (7) were fixed such that 
c = a and <P = 1. These values of the parameters imply that the exchange rate follows a 
random walk process without drift within each regime. Although the empirical evidence is 
not very favourable to of this hypothesis for ERM currencies3, we use it as a simplification 
that facilitates the subsequent analysis and allows isolating the proposed measure of risk from 
the possible effects caused by the changes in the mean· reversion process throughout the four 
subperiods studied4. 
As regards the estimation of the GARCH processes, Table 4.1 shows the results for the 
subperiods considered. As can be observed, with the exception of the third subperiod (char-
acterised by a constant variance), the model that best explains the conditional variances is a 
GARCH(I,I). 
In the breakdown of the expected rate of exchange rate jump by the probability of the jump 
and its expected size, the size corresponding to each of the fou.r subperiods was obtained under 
the criteria described forthwith. If the average value in the year 1988 is fixed as a reference, 
at the time of the peseta's entry into the ERM the Spanish economy had accumulated losses 
3See Frankel and Phillips (1991), Holden and Vikoren (1992), Ayuso, Perez Jura.do and Restoy (1993), 
Svensson (1993) and Alberola, Humberto and Orts (1994). 
4ln any case, all ql1alitative results proved to be robust to an alternative specification where the exchange 
rates were allowed to follow unrestricted stationary AR(I) processes (see chart 4.4.). 
- 12-
in competitiveness ranging b£!twccn 3% (production prices) and 10% (unit labour costs in 
the manufa.c:turing sector). Tn addition, one month after the devaluation of September 1992, 
the pesetatO.mark t!xchange rate was depreciated by approximately 13%. Taking these data 
as a reference, we imposed linearly increasing size from 5% to 13% for the first subperiod. 
As for the sef.ond and third subperiods, we used constant sizes of 7% and 5% respectively. 
Those sizes correspond approximately to the observed market depreciations one month after 
the third devaluation and the band widening respectively. Lastly, for the fourth subperiod we 
used the minimum constant size compatible with the observed interest rate differentials5. This 
assumption is justified by the absence of devaluations in the period and by the elimination of 
the currency real overvaluation as a consequence of the three devaluations experienced by the 
peseta. 
Chart 4.2 shows the expected rate of jump of the exchange rate and its breakdown on the 
expected size a1ld the probahility of the jump. As can be observed, the product (p1de) tended 
to move downwards from the peseta's entry into the ERM until approximately the Danish 
referendum of .Tune 1992. It then headed on a generally upward course, albeit with significant 
falls after each devaluation. Following the upturn in July 1993 and the widening of the bands 
on August 2 of that year, the rate slipped again and, by the end of February 1994, reached 
values close to those of June 1992. 
With respect to the probability and expected size of the jump, the pronounced difference 
observed between the periods prior and subsequent to the widening of the bands is congruent 
with the interpretation occasionally made of the difference between a system of pegged ex­
change rates and a system of more flexible rates (Edison and Melvin, 1990): characteristically, 
in a pegged exchange rate system, the probability is small (less than 15% in this case) that a 
large jump will occur (up to 13%) whereas, in a system of more flexible rates, there is a large 
prob.bility (nearly 50%) of. small jump (less tb.n 1%). 
Lastly, the within the regime conditional varia.nce (VtVt+'T) = (vt'1t+'T) can be obtained by 
using expression (12) and the GARCH estimates of Table 4.1. 
!oNote thILt, since prob"bility is bounded by 0 and 1, the maximum (positive) value for the observed interest 
differential is the lower limit fOl a. (oonstr.nt) si!e of the expec.:ted jump. 
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After obtaining the probability of a change of regime (Pt), the expected jump in the 
pesetafD-mark exchange rate (dd and the within the regime conditional variance (vtvH-r), 
the exchange rate risk associated to the pesetafD-mark exchange rate is estimated by com-
puting equation (8). 
Chart 4.3 compares the within the regime (uncorrected) conditional variance together with 
the (corrected) conditional variance of the exchange rate. 
The key finding derived from the analysis of Chart 4.3 is the enormous quantitative impor-
tance of the correction arising from the possibility of a jump in the market exchange rate. In 
fact, it can be observed that, due to this correction, the exchange rate risk that characterised 
the period between June 1989 and August 1992 is approximately four times greater than what 
would be deduced from the simple estimation of the within the rr:.gime volatility. During the 
crisis period (September 1992-July 1993), the exchange rate risk is still s'ubstantially higher 
than what would be reflected in the standard analysis of observed exchange rate volatility. 
However, after the widening of fluctuation bands, the narrowing of the interest rate differ-
entia! with Germany makes the discrepancy between the proposed measure of risk and the 
standard volatility estimates much less relevant6• 
The importance of the correction of the conventional volatility indicator is also evident if 
we compare the levels of the peseta's exchange rate risk before and after fluctuation bands 
were widened (August 2, 1993). In this sense, the performance of the standard volatility 
(uncorrected conditional variance) suggests that the volatility of exchange rates follOWing the 
widening of the bands is practically three times greater than the level observed in the period 
prior to September 1992 and only 25% lower than in the crisis period. However, the analysis �f 
the corrected conditional variance shows that, after an initial bout of high volatility, the risk 
characterising the wide-band period is 60% lower than in the crisis period and 25% lower than 
during the three-year period that preceded the first devaluation of the peseta. in the ERM. 
These findings signal tha.t, as expected, the larger margin of fluctuation a.vailable has 
transla.ted into more volatile exchange rates. However I the observed gain in credibility of the 
'This r(':Suit does not dedsivf'ly depend on imposing a relatively small jump in the last subperiod. It holds 
also for reasonably higher sizes (e.g. 3%). 
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fluduatj'on regime has a greater impact on the conditional variance of the exchange rate than 
the rise in observed volatility. Thus, contrary to what conventional estimators suggest, the 
proposed indicator shows that the exchange rate risk of the peseta has subsided since the 
widening of the ba.nds. 
Since other currencies' interest rate differentials with the D-mark have also narrowed con­
siderably, it makes sense t.o analyse whether the observed effect of greater credibility gives rise 
to conclusions on exchange rate risk similar to those obta.ined for the peseta. 
4 Application to other currencies 
his section examines the patterns of risk associated to exchange rates vis-a.-vis the D-mark for 
the rE'st of the currencies that belong, or have belonged to, the Exchange Rate Mechanism, 
with the usual exception of the Dutch guilder. 
The period analysed is the same as for the peseta except for those currencies whose incor­
poration in the ERM took place later. As a result, the samples for the Portuguese escudo and 
the British pound begin on April 9, 1992 and October 8, 1990, respectively. The assumptions 
used in obtaining the proposed measure of exchange risk are also similar to those a.pplied in the 
Spanish case. Thus, we impose a random walk process for all exchange rates and the sample is 
divided into several subperiods. In each case, the break points chosen are those corresponding 
to devaluations, to changes in the width of the fluctuation band or to the switch to free float· 
ing. For the French franc, the Danish krone, the Belgian franc and the Irish pound, periods 
of exchange rate instability are also slightly different: between September 1992 and August 
1993 in the case of the first three currencies, and between September 1992 and January 1993 
for the Irish pound. 
Chart 5,1 shows the expected size of the exchange rate jump assumed for each of the 
currencies and the subperiods considered. In general, for the periods prior to a currency's 
devaluation or to a switch to free floating, the expected jumps imposed a.re equal to the 
variations in the average excha.nge rates that arose a.fter these events occurred. These variables 
either rema.in constant or grow linea.rly from lower values when they are very high and coincide 
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with periods of a progressive accumulation of losses of competitiveness. For the free floating 
or wide band periods, the expected jumps correspond to the maximum value registered by 
the interest rate differentials (i.e., the minimum constant value which is compatible with the 
implied probability being not higher than one) . Since the Danish krone, the French franc 
and the Belgia.n franc have suffered neither a devalua.tion nor significant real excha.nge rate 
appreciations, the expected jumps for the narrow-band period were set equal the size of their 
last devaluation. This same criterion was applied to the Irish pound in the period prior to the 
British pound's withdrawal from the system. 
Thus, by following the steps detailed in the previous sections, the measures of exchange 
rate risk presented in Charts 5.1 to 5.7 were obtained from the results of the estimation of 
GARCH( 1,1) models for the conditional variances of the exchange rates which figure in Table 
5.2 and the I-month interest rate differentials with the D-mark. 
As can be observed, the exchange rate risk perceived by agents is, in all cases, substantially 
higher in most of the sample when measured by the corrected conditional variance than when 
the standard measure of conditional volatility is used. Logically, this difference is less striking 
in the periods when the interest rate differential with Germany is small. This occurs for the 
former narrow-band currencies and the British pound for several months before the crisis. Both 
measures are also similar during the stages of free floating and of ±15% bands, as expected 
for regimes of greater exchange rate flexibility and narrower interest rate differentials. 
These findings underscore, once again, the importance of considering the possible existence 
of imperfect credibility in the exchange rate fluctuation regime when estimating the degree of 
exchange risk perceived by market agents. Thus, depending on how agents value the possi­
bility of a future jump in the the exchange rate, the observed volatility provides incomplete 
information about the uncertainty associated to the exchange rate. Moreover, not only does 
the scale of the exchange rate risk differ greatly according io the measure used, but al so, in 
most cases, its variation between one period and another. In this sense, the estimates show 
that the proposed corredion is decisive -to the extent that, for most of the currencies stud­
ied, it reverses the conclusions on the conduct of exchange rate risk after the widening of the 
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fluctuation bands. 
As can be seen in Charts 5.1. to 5.7, during the ERM crisis between September 1992 and 
August 1993, there was -not surprisingly- a significant increase in the exchange rate risk of all 
currencies considered. However, as from August 1993, for the currencies that remruned in the 
ERM, ,we observe a reduction in the corrected conditional variance (much more pronounced 
than what the uncorrected conditional variance reflects) that places the level of exchange rate 
risk below the level registered in the crisis period. 
Naturally, the main concern caused by the widening of fluctuation bands does not refer to a 
possible increase in the volatility of exchange rates in relation to the periods of strongest tension 
and frequent speculative attacks, but rather to the possible difficulty in recovering the levels 
of exchange rate stability that characterised the three years prior to the crisis. Nonetheless, 
as seen in Charts 5.1 to 5.5, a comparison between the exchange rate risk registered after the 
widening of the bands and the levels prevailing during the pre-crisis period of stability should, 
at least partiaUy, dispel this concern. Thus, for the French franc and the Danish krone, in the 
last part of the sample, the corrected conditional variance of the exchange rate shows levels 
similar to those prevailing during the year prior to the crisis and lower than those estimated 
for the first two years of the sample; for the escudo, from the very start of the period of 
±15% fluctuation bands, exchange rate volatility is significantly lower than during the period 
between its entry into the ERM and September 1992. 
The conclusion is, however, different in the case of the Belgian franc and the Irish pound, 
whose exchange rate risk is now higher than when narrow bands were in force. This is explained 
by the high credibility of their exchange regimes in the pre-crisis period and by the increase 
in the volatility of their exchange rates after the widening of the bands. Note, nonetheless, 
that, even in these cases, the exchange rate risk observed .several months after the widening 
of the bands is appreciably lower than in the case of the peseta and the escudo in practically 
the entire period between their respective entries in the ERM and the outbreak of the crisis. 
Unlike what occurred for most currencies which widened their fluctuation bands, the cur­
rencies which withdrew from the ERM have been subject to a substantial increase in their 
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associated exchange rate risk. As shown in Charts 5.6 and 5.7 , the corrected conditional 
variance of the lira and the British pound moves in the same direction as their uncorrected 
conditional variance. In the last part of the sample, both currencies register higher exchange 
rate risk than when they belonged to the System and, moreover, reflect the highest risk among 
the currencies considered. Thus, the risk associated to the British pound and, especially, the 
lira., not only exceeds that attached to currencies traditionally characterised by greater risk 
but which, nonetheless, opted not to leave the ERM (the peSeta and the escudo) but is also 
higher than that in the rase of currencies hit by stronger fluctuations after the widening of the 
bands (the Belgian franc and the Irish pound). 
In sum, the analysis of this group of currencies confirms, in all essential aspects, the results 
obtained for the peseta. Thus, that analysis confirms the great importance of taking into 
account the possible existence of imperfect credibility in the exchange rate fluctuation regime 
when measuring exchange rate risk. When this factor is considered, not only does the estimated 
scale of risk change radically (in the periods prior to the widening of fluctuation bands, it is 
significantly greater than that reflected in conditional variance) but also, for most currencies, 
there is a reversal in the direction in which it varies after the widening of the bands to ±15%. 
As a result, exchange rate risk is now lower than during the period of exchange rate stability 
under the former fluctuation bands. Nonetheless, the application of a corrected conditional 
volatility measure does not allow changing the conclusions with respect to the conduct and 
relative scale of exchange rate risk for the currencies that went from a regime of fluctuation 
bands to another of free floating. The exchange rate risk estimated for the first few months of 
1994 is greater than the one corresponding to the period when they belonged to the· ERM. 
5 Conclusions 
The reform of the Exchange Rate Mechanism arising from the widening of fluctuation bands 
is often viewed as a lesser evil that facilitates the survival of the ERM at the expense of 
distorting its essence. Thus, the idea has spread that it was necessary to give up the beneficial 
effE'!cts on exchange ra.te risk associated to less volatile parities in order to guarantee the 
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sustainability of the EMS in the context of free capital flows and scant convergence among 
European economies. In other terms, the reform of the System would have allowed achieving 
a greater degree of sustainability at the price of heightening exchange rate volatility. Even 
though the standard volatility indicators support this pessimistic view of the impact of the 
ERM's reform on exchange rate risk, the present paper provides"e,ridence that counters this 
hypothesis. 
As a first step, we questioned the general prac�ice of measuring exchange rate risk by 
applying the standard models of  conditional heteroskedasticity to the obs�rved exchange rate 
data. This practice fails to take into account much of the risk assumed by agents when they 
operate with currencies of scant volatility but which fluctuate around parities perceived to be 
fairly unsustainable. To surmount this problem, we propose an indicator of exchange rate risk 
that explicitly reflects the possible lack of credibility of the fluctuation regime. 
The empirical implementation of the indicator involves assumptions - difficult to test -
regarding the expected size of the exchange rate jumps associated to the changes of regime. 
Since the quantitative results inevitably depend on these assumptions, we used conservative 
criteria which are, in any event, consistent with those habitually applied in the literature. 
Hence, the expected sizes never exceed the jumps that effectively occulred and are always 
lower than the losses of competitiveness accumulated by the different countries. In addition, 
qualitative conclusions proved to be robust to moderate variations in the assumptions applied. 
This indicator was applied to the peseta and other currencies that belong, or belonged, to 
the ERM in order to evaluate the evolution of exchange rate risk within the EMS in recent 
years. The following conclusions were drawn: 
- The conventional measures of volatility considerably underestimate the exchange rate 
risk of aU the currencies in prart.ica.lly the entire period when narrow bands were in force. 
- The proposed indicator signals a pattern of exchange rate risk in the ERM very different 
from tha.t suggested by conventional volatility yardsticks. Within months from the widening 
of the bands, for most of the currencies that remained in the ERM, the prevailing exchange 
ra.te risk is not only substa,ntially lower than during the crisis period; it is also milder than 
- 19 -
during the period prior to the signing of the Maastricht Treaty and comparable to the levels 
observed during the period of greatest stability in the narrow· band ERM. Additionally, in the 
only two cases where exchange rate risk has risen since August 2, 1993 (the Belgian franc and 
the Irish pound), its level is lower than that registered by the higher·risk currencies (the peseta 
and the escudo) during the system's most stable period. 
- The exchange rate risk associated to the currencies that remained in the System is, in 
any event, lower than that attached to the currencies that switched to a free floating regime, 
whose risk is now substantially higher than when they belonged to the ERM. 
The results obtained suggest that, even in the absence of speculative attacks, exchange 
rate regimes that severely limit the fluctuation of exchange rates can have negative effects on 
the perceived exchange risk, if those regimes require economic policies that the market con­
siders fairly unsustainable. Under these circumstances, to reduce the risk of f?reign currency 
transactions, it may be preferable to adopt less ambitious exchange rate commitments that 
are flexible enough to warrant an acceptable degree of credibility, even though they may imply 
greater exchange rate volatility. Nonetheless, the results for the lira and the British pound 
suggest that, from the standpoint of minimising exchange rate risk, the optimal degree of 
flexibility is not close to the one corresponding to a free floating regime. 
Lastly, a note of caution. It must be borne in mind that the gain in credibility observed in 
the ERM, which explains much of the evidence presented, cannot be attributed solely to the 
System's reform. Thus, the positive effect of the exchange rate adjustments made during the 
crisis and of the easing of economic policy dilemmas is also at play. Naturally, the reappearance 
of disequilibria or other destabilising factors could eventually cause a substantial increase in 
exchange rate risk, even under a regime as flexible as the one now in force in the EMS. 
- 20-
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Table 4.1. GARCH ESTIMATES: ESP/DEM 
St.+1 - st. = Et,+l' Et,+llt.-D(O,ht,) 
ht, = Qo + alE! + Pl�-l 
Subsample a, a, II, X'(5) N 
22 .06 . 89-15 .09 . 92 . 91E-6 . 28 .55 2 . 99 782 
( . 22E-6) ( .05) ( . 07) 
18.09.92-12 .05 . 93 . 66E-5 .33 . 35 7.64 155 
( . 24E-5) ( .18) ( .19) 
15 . 05 . 93-22 . 07 . 93 . 70E-3 1 . 83 47 
(-- ) 
26 .07 . 93-25 . 02 . 94 . 11E-5 .14 .80 5 . 44. 146 
( . 73E-6 )  ( .07) ( . 08) 
NOTES: 
- Standard errors in parenthesis . 
.. N stands for the number of observations . 
.. X2(5) stands for the LM test on residual heteroscedasticity up 
to order 5 .  
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Table 5 . 2 .  GARCH ESTIMATES: OTHER CURRENCIES I DElI 
St+l - st. = Et,+1 ' EUIIt. -D( 0 ,ht> 
, ht = Qo + atEt + �l �-l 
Subsample a, 0, II, X'(5) N 
20.06.89- . 15E-6 . 20 . 64  4 . 69 785 
15.09 . 92 ( .05E-6) ( . 05 )  ( .08) 
FRF 17.09 . 92- . 20E-6 . 22 . 70 4 . 97 210 
30.07.93 ( .08E-6) ( . 07)  ( .06) 
03 .08 . 93- .03E-6 .04 .93 5 . 88 160 
25 .03 . 94 ( . 03E-6) ( .03) ( .03) 
20 . 06 . 89- .12E-6 . 26 .65 4 . 07 791 
15 . 09 . 92 ( .04E-6) ( .05) ( .06) 
DKK 17.09 . 92- .17E-6 . 31 .68 3 .58 208 
30 . 07 . 93 ( .08E-6) ( .09) ( .07) 
03 . 08 . 93- .09E-6 .05 .92 6 .02 140 
25 . 02 . 94 ( .08E-6) ( .03) ( . 03)  
09.04. 92- .05E-4 . 28 .47 3 . 74 263 
12.05 . 93 ( . 01E-4) ( . 09) ( .09) 
PTE 14.05 . 93- . 03E-4 . 12 . 79 2 . 97 53 
30.07.93 ( .03E-4) ( . 20) ( . 1 1 )  
02 .08 . 93- .96E-6 . 1 1  . 77 1 .  79 151 
15.03 . 94 ( .66E-6) ( . 06) ( . 10) 
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Table 5 . 2 .  (CONT. )  
Subsample Q. Q, p ,  X'(S) N 
22.06 . 89- . 20E-6 .18  . 77 3 .66 134 
05 . 01 . 90 ( . 16E-6) ( . 10) ( . 10) 
LIT 09 . 01 . 90- . 32E-6 . 19 . 62 8 . 39 64B 
1 1 . 09 . 92 ( . 09E-6) ( .05) ( . 08) 
18 .09 . 92- .05E-4 . 09 . 78 6.58 451 
25 . 02 . 94 ( .02E-4) ( . 03)  ( . 07) 
GBP 19.06 . 89- .B6E-6 . 19 . 71 7 . 02 46B 
17 .09 .92 ( . 2BE-6) ( .06) ( . 06) 
1 7 . 09 . 92- .49E-6 .OB .90 1 . 93 351 
15 . 03 . 94 ( .46E-6) ( . 03)  ( .04) 
19.06 . 89- . 19E-7 .16  .B4 9 . 11 790 
1 1 . 09 . 92 ( .57E-8) ( .02) ( . 02) 
15 . 09 . 92- . 09E-4 -- -- 1 . 24 90 
29.01 . 93 (--) 
IEP 02.02.93- . 95E-6 . 24 -- 2 .05 122 
30 . 07 . 93 ( . lIE-6) ( . OB) 
03 . 0B . 93- . 1 0E-4 . 26 -- 3 . 73 176 
26 .04 . 94 ( . 10E-4) ( . 08) 
20 .06 . 89- . 29E-B . 13  .B8 7 . 75 797 
1B.09 .92 ( . JOE-8) ( .02) ( .01) 
, 
BEF 21 . 09 . 92- .48E-7 .40 .57 3 . 33 207 
29 . 07 . 93 ( . 13E-7) ( . OB) ( . 05) 
03 . 08 .93- . 15E-6 .46 .61 3 . 10 17B 
26 . 04 . 94 ( . 7E-7) ( . IB)  ( . 10) 
NOTES: 
- Standard errors in parenthesis . 
- N stands for the number of observations. 
- X'(5) stands for the LM test on residual heteroscedasticity up 
to order 5 .  
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